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The popular discounted utilitarian criterion for infinite horizon social choice has been criticized on the 
ground that it treats successive generations unfairly. I propose to evaluate intergenerational welfare with a 
rank- discounted utilitarian (RDU) criterion instead. The criterion amounts to discounted utilitarianism on 
non-decreasing paths, but it treats all generations impartially: discounting becomes the mere expression of 
intergenerational  inequality  aversion.  I  show  that  more  inequality  averse  RDU  societies  have  higher 
social discount rates when future generations are better-off. I apply the RDU approach in two benchmark 
economic growth models and I prove that it promotes sustainable policies maximizing discounted utility. 
 
Keywords: intergenerational equity, social discounting, discounted utilitarianism, sustainability. 
JEL Classification: D63, H43, Q56 
 
                                                           
1 U n iversité  catholique  de  Louvain,  CORE a n d  C h a i r  L h o i s t  B e r g h m a n s  i n  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  E c o n o m i c s ,  B-1348 
Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. E-mail: stephane.zuber@uclouvain.be 
I would like to thank Marc Fleurbaey and François Maniquet for provocative and fruitful discussions at an early stage 
of this project. I am greatly indebted to Geir Asheim for very accurate and helpful remarks on a preliminary version of 
the paper. I would also like to thank Antoine Bommier, Christian Gollier, Luc Lauwers and Michel Le Breton for their 
comments and for several useful references. Many thanks for seminar audiences at CORE and Toulouse School of 
Economics. 
This paper presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated by the 
Belgian State, Prime Minister's Office, Science Policy Programming. The scientific responsibility is assumed by the 
author. 1 Introduction
The most popular objective function used to dene the optimal policy in innite
horizon models is the discounted utilitarian (DU) criterion, W(x) =
P+1
t=1 tu(xt),
where 0 <  < 1.
The criterion has been heavily criticized on the ground that it treats succes-
sive generations dierently. Many economists in the utilitarian tradition have
denounced this deviation from the ideal of equal regard for all individuals. For
instance, Frank Ramsey famously described discounting as a \practice which
is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagina-
tion"(Ramsey , 1928, p.543). Among others, Pigou (1920) and Harrod (1948)
have also stigmatized discounting.
Drawing on these criticisms, a prolic literature has studied whether it would
be possible to combine the principle of procedural equity (equal regard for all
generations) with the widely admitted Pareto principle. Although some positive
results have been obtained, most of this literature stemming from Diamond
(1965) has come to a negative conclusion. Even if equitable Paretian criteria do
exist, they cannot be explicitly described (Basu and Mitra , 2003; Zame , 2007;
Lauwers , 2010).
At the same time, several authors have pointed out the distributional con-
sequences of not discounting future generations' welfare. Mirrlees (1967) com-
puted optimal intertemporal consumption patterns in plausible economic models
using the undiscounted utilitarian criterion (the so-called Ramsey criterion). He
observed that present generations should save up to 50 % of their net income for
the sake of future generations. The nding was best summarized by philosopher
John Rawls who declared that \the utilitarian doctrine may direct us to demand
heavy sacrices of the poorer generations for the sake of greater advantages for
the later ones that are far better-o"(Rawls, 1971, p. 253). He went on saying
that \these consequences can be to some degree corrected by discounting the
welfare of those living in the future"(Rawls, 1971, p. 262).
Although Rawls did not adopt discounted utilitarianism (for the very reason
that it fails to comply with procedural equity), most of the economic literature
1has endorsed it, considering the solution as the lesser of two evils. Yet the conict
between procedural equity and distributional equity in a utilitarian context has
remained unsolved.
The above distributional justication for discounted utilitarianism critically
relies on the assumption that future generations can be made better-o. Asheim
and Buchholz (2003) noticed that, in certain technological contexts, for instance
in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of growth with a non-renewable resource, fu-
ture generations may not be better-o. Undiscounted utilitarianism may then
yield more satisfactory recommendations than discounted utilitarianism. The
key point is that the discount rate is only a way of preventing too much sacri-
ces for the sake of people who are already favored. For this to be true, it is
critical that generations' rank in time corresponds to their rank in the income
distribution.
If we retain the interpretation of the discount factor as preventing high sac-
rices from the poor, it looks closely related to the social weights used in rank-
dependent measures of social welfare. An example of a rank-dependent criterion
is the Gini social welfare function. Generalizations thereof have been proposed
by Weymark (1981) and Ebert (1988). The main feature of rank-depended so-
cial welfare functions is that they put more weight on the utility of the worse-os.
Rank-dependent weights simply represent the society's aversion to inequality.
In this paper, I propose to apply rank-dependent methods to intergenera-
tional justice. More precisely, I put forward rank-discounted utilitarian social
welfare functions:





In this expression, the consumption stream x[ ] = (x[1];x[2]; ;x[t];) is a
reordering of the consumption stream x = (x1;x2; ;xt;) such that x[1] 
x[2]    x[t]  .
The rank-discounted utilitarian approach coincides with discounted utilitar-
ianism on the set of non-decreasing consumption streams. Utility discounting
is then justied as an expression of inequality aversion when future generations
are better-o. However, and contrary to the discounted utilitarian approach,
2rank-discounted utilitarianism also satises procedural equity: two intergenera-
tional consumption streams that are identical up to a permutation are deemed
equally good.
Rank-discounted utilitarian social welfare functions respect both procedural
equity and the weak Pareto principle on their domain of denition. They hence
overcome the impossibility results in the tradition of Diamond (1965) on their
domain. A natural question is then: under which conditions can rank-discounted
utilitarian social welfare functions be dened? An evident necessary condition
is that consumption streams can be re-ordered in non-decreasing sequences. It
turns out that this is a non-trivial task. In Section 3, I characterize the set of in-
nite consumption streams that can be re-ordered. Restricting attention to this
set permits to obtain equitable Paretian representations of social preferences.
In Section 4, I oer a complete characterization of rank-discounted utilitar-
ian preferences. This characterization is clearly related to Koopmans (1960)
characterization of discounted utilitarian preferences. The dierence is that
his separability and stationarity axioms are imposed on non-decreasing streams
only. Independence axioms on ordered streams are common in the theory of
decision under uncertainty (Gilboa , 1987; Wakker , 1993) and in the theory of
inequality measurement (Weymark , 1981; Ebert , 1988). With the exception
of R ebill e (2007), they have never been used in the theory of intertemporal
decision making yet. They permit to weight utilities according to their rank in
a distribution, which is exactly what rank-discounted utilitarian criteria do.
In Section 5, I provide conditions for a social observer using a rank-discounted
utilitarian criterion to be inequality averse, in the sense that she always prefers a
consumption stream obtained from another through a Pigou-Dalton redistribu-
tive transfer. I also provide conditions to compare two social observers in terms
of inequality aversion. When the social observer has homothetic preferences,
these conditions are very simple: she needs to discount ranks more and to use a
more concave utility function.
The importance of distributive equity in the spirit of Atkinson (1970) has
been addressed in many papers in the literature on intergenerational equity.1
1For an early discussion, see Birchenhall and Grout (1979). Bossert, Sprumont and Suzu-
3However, they have not investigated the consequences of dierent degrees of
inequality aversion on society's choice. I will on the contrary uphold that in-
equality aversion is a central notion for intergenerational problems and that
dierent degrees of inequality aversion have important policy implications.
A parallel can be drawn with optimal taxation problems. In optimal taxation
problems, there is a trade-o between eciency and distributional equity that
usually arises from imperfect information issues (typically, work eort is not ob-
servable, so that the society needs to provide incentives preventing equality). In
intertemporal problems, there is also an eciency-equity trade-o, but it now
arises from the technological asymmetry: it is possible today to accumulate cap-
ital in order to produce more tomorrow, but the reverse is impossible. Like in
the optimal taxation problems, inequality aversion plays a key role in the de-
nition of the optimal distribution. So in intergenerational problems inequality
aversion should modify policy recommendations. I show that it is indeed the
case.
In Section 6, I explore the implications of rank-discounted utilitarian social
welfare functions for the social discount rate. The social discount rate has been
one of the most debated economic parameter in recent years. The highly pub-
licized debates surrounding the question of climate change have highlighted its
importance for policy evaluation. An `ethical' view has suggested low values for
the social discount rate, on the ground that pure-time discounting violates pro-
cedural equity. Rank-discounted utilitarianism suggests an alternative `ethical'
view on discounting: discounting is only an expression of society's aversion to
inequality.
In Section 6, I indeed prove that a more inequality averse social observer
always discount more the future, provided that future generations are better-o.
This has important policy implications. If future generations are expected to
be better-o in spite of climate change, then a more inequality averse rank-
discounted utilitarian decision maker will rather adopt the recommendations of
Nordhaus (2008) to have gradual emission control policies rather than those of
mura (2007) and Hara, Shinotsuka, Suzumura and Xu (2008) are examples of recent discus-
sions.
4Stern (2006) who calls for immediate action. However, with the rank-dependent
utilitarian model, discounting depends on a generation's rank in the intergener-
ational distribution rather than its rank in time. Then, if future generations are
expected to be less well-o because of climate change, the social discount rate
should on the contrary be negative, and strong action should be undertaken to
mitigate climate change.
In Section 7, I show that inequality aversion also plays a role in the choice
of the optimal growth policy. I rst indicate how RDU preferences can be ex-
tended to obtain operational choice criteria. The extension is based on versions
of the procedural equity and eciency properties underlying RDU. I prove that,
under a technological requirement of productivity, ERDU preferences promote
sustainable discounted utilitarian policies: they chose the non-decreasing path
maximizing discounted utility. The result can be applied to two benchmark mod-
els: the Ramsey growth model and the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of growth
with a non-renewable resource. Inequality aversion plays a crucial role. A more
inequality averse society indeed less often suggests any growth: if the initial
stock of capital is high enough, the society prefers to maintain consumption for
ever. More inequality aversion then yields lower long-run perspectives.
To reach these conclusions, I start in Section 2 by introducing the framework
of our analysis.
2 The framework
Let N denote as usual the set of natural numbers f1;2;3;g. Let R denote
the set of real numbers, R+ the set of nonnegative real numbers, and R++ the
set of positive real numbers.
Denote x = (x1;x2; ;xt;) an innite stream (or allocation), where xt 2
R+ is a one-dimensional indicator of the well-being of generation t. Contrary to
most of the literature on the evaluation of innite streams, xt is not assimilated to
a utility number, but to the aggregate consumption of generation t. Let restrict










the set of possible allocations.
For x, y 2 X, write x  y whenever xt  yt for all t 2 N; write x > y if
x  y and x 6= y; and write x  y whenever xt > yt for all t 2 N. For any
T 2 N and x;y 2 X, denote xTy the consumption stream z such that zt = xt
for all t  T and zt = yt for all t > T. For any x 2 R+ and y 2 X, (x;y)
denotes the stream (x;y1;y2;).
Three subsets of X will be of particular interest. First, the set of stationary
consumption streams, denoted Xc. For any x 2 R+, xc denote the allocation
xc 2 X such that xc
t = x for all t 2 N. The set of stationary consumption
streams is Xc = fxc;x 2 R+g.
A second subset of X is the set of non-decreasing streams in X. This set is
denoted X+ = fx 2 X : xt  xt+18t 2 Ng.
The last subset of X playing a key role in the remainder of the paper is
the set of allocations whose elements can be permuted to obtain non-decreasing
streams. This set is denoted  X. To introduce it formally, some more notation is
needed. Let  be the set of all permutations on N. For any  2  and x 2 X, let
x = (x(1);x(2); ;x(t);). The denition of the set  X is then as follows
 X = fx 2 X : 9 2 ;x 2 X+g. For x 2  X, let x[ ] be an allocation such
that there exist a permutation  2  for which x[t] = x(t), whatever t 2 N, and
x[ ] 2 X+. Hence [t] is the generation whose rank is t in the intergenerational
distribution. And x[ ] is a re-ordering of x in a non-decreasing sequence.2 It
will also be useful to denote ftg the rank of generation t in the intergenerational
distribution.
The following inclusions hold: Xc  X+   X  X. In a nite setting,  X
would be exactly equal to X. But, as will be discussed in the next section, this
2There is not necessarily a unique x[ ] for a given x 2  X. For instance, if xt = x for some
t 6= , there are at least two re-orderings in a non-decreasing sequence. In the sequel, x[ ]
denote any allocation satisfying the conditions. The Anonymity Axiom will guarantee that
the choice of a particular allocation does not matter.
6is not the case any more in an innite setting, because some sequences may not
be reordered.
A social welfare relation (SWR) on a subset e X  X is a binary relation
, where for any x;y 2 e X, x  y entails that the consumption stream x is
deemed socially at least as good as y. Let  and  denote the symmetric and
asymmetric parts of . A social welfare function (SWF) representing  is a
mapping W : e X ! R with the property that for all x;y 2 e X, W(x)  W(y) if
and only if x  y.
3 The representation of equitable Paretian social welfare
relations: the role of ordered streams
The diculty of representing equitable and Paretian preferences over innite
utility streams has been the topic of a prolic literature since the seminal con-
tribution by Diamond (1965). General possibility results exist (for instance
Svensson , 1980), but most of the literature has reached negative a conclusion:
although equitable ecient preferences exist, they cannot be explicitly described
(Basu and Mitra , 2003; Zame , 2007; Lauwers , 2010).
In this section, I highlight the role that ordered streams can play to overcome
the impossibility on part of the domain. Let  a SWR that is used to rank
alternative intergenerational allocations in e X. The set e X is a subset of X on
which I seek to obtain an equitable Paretian (ecient) representation of . A
rst fundamental property that will be required of the SWR is the following:
Axiom 1 Order. The relation  is complete, reexive and transitive on e X.
A SWR satisfying Axiom 1 is named a social welfare order (SWO). The
literature has often looked for SWOs on the whole set X. However, many popular
criteria for the evaluation of innite streams are incomplete. Notable examples
are the so-called von Weizs acker criterion and Gale criterion. Recent literature
has promoted appealing incomplete SWRs that can be completed by use of
Szpilrajn's lemma (see, among others, Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura , 2007;
Basu and Mitra , 2007). In this paper, the analysis focuses on a subset e X only.
7The SWR may be incomplete on the whole domain X, but it is complete on the
sub-domain e X.
In addition to Axiom 1, the core axioms in the literature on the aggregation of
innite streams are the Pareto axioms and the anonymity axioms which represent
the ideal of equal concern for all generations (procedural equity).
In this paper, I use an intermediate version of the widely admitted Pareto
principle.
Axiom 2 Intermediate Pareto. (i) For any x;y 2 e X, if x  y then x  y.
(ii) For any x;y 2 e X, if there exists T 2 N such that xt = yt for all t < T and
xt > yt for all t  T, then x  y.
The Intermediate Pareto axiom is a requirement concerning the respect of
generations' interests. It ensures that, whenever all generations experience an
increase in their consumptions, the social welfare does not decrease. As indicated
by its name, the axiom is weaker than the Strong Pareto axiom but stronger than
the Weak Pareto axiom. The axiom is slightly dierent from the `Intermediate
Pareto' of Lauwers (2010): Lauwers postulates sensitivity in each innite set of
coordinates, while I assume sensitivity to a particular innite set of coordinates,
namely `future' ones.
The reason why I use this new version of the axiom will appear in Section 7:
it will make it possible to ensure that in the presence of a productive technology
only non-decreasing paths are chosen. However, the Weak Pareto axiom would
be sucient to obtain the characterization result in Section 4. Remark that,
contrary to the Weak Pareto axiom, the Intermediate Pareto axiom excludes a
dictatorship of the present in the sense of Chichilnisky (1996).
Throughout the paper, the most general version of the anonymity require-
ment will be used.
Axiom 3 Anonymity. For any  2  and x 2 e X, x  x.
I use this strong version in order to draw conclusions in terms of inequality
aversion. Inequality aversion deals with the distribution of resources, indepen-
dently of whom receives the resource. It is hence necessary to deem equivalent
8consumption streams inducing the same intergenerational distribution, which is
what the stronger Anonymity axiom does.
A weaker version of anonymity that is often considered in the literature in-
volves only nite permutations. Finite permutations on N are permutations that
dier from identity on a nite set. Let denote F the set of nite permutations.
Axiom 3' (Weak Anonymity). For any  2 F and x 2 e X, x  x.
A SWR satisfying Axiom 1-3 will be named an equitable Paretian SWO
and a SWR satisfying axioms 1, 2 and 3' a weakly equitable Paretian SWO. A
SWO can be `explicitly described' if its graph is a denable set (i.e. there exists
a set-theoretic formula that denes it; see Zame , 2007, p. 197, for a formal
denition). A SWO is representable if there exists a SWF that represents it. A
representable SWO can be explicitly described.
Focusing on the set  X, it becomes possible to obtain representable equitable
Paretian SWOs. This is exemplied by rank-discounted utilitarian SWOs (in
short RDU SWOs).
Denition 1 Rank-Discounted Utilitarian SWO. A SWR on a  X is a Rank-
Discounted Utilitarian SWO (RDU SWO) if and only if it is represented by the
social welfare function:





where 0 <  < 1 is a real number and the function u is continuous and increas-
ing.
An accepted response to impossibility results in social choice theory is to
look for restricted domains on which possibility is restored. It turns out that
 X is a domain which allows to overcome many negative results obtained in the
literature on the aggregation of innite streams. In particular, the next Proposi-
tion contrasts some possibilities allowed by  X with two important impossibility
results found in the recent literature:
Proposition 1.
91. (a) There exist no equitable Paretian SWOs on X.
(b) But there exist equitable Paretian SWOs on  X.
2. (a) No weakly equitable Paretian SWOs on X can be `explicitly described'.
(b) But there exist representable weakly equitable Paretian SWOs on  X.
Proof. The proof of 1.(b) and 2.(b) is provided by RDU SWOs who satisfy
Axioms 1 , 2 and 3 (and thus 3') on the set  X.
The proof of 1.(a) is Theorem 1 in Fleurbaey and Michel (2003). Let us briey
recall the proof. Consider the intergenerational allocations x = (2;3;1;4;1=2;5;
1=3;6; ;k;1=k   2) and y = (1;2;1=2;3;1=3;4;1=4; ;k;1=k;). An
equitable Paretian SWR  on X must rank x  y by Axiom 2. But, by Axiom
3, it must also be indierent between the two options, x  y, a contradiction.
The proof of 2.(a) is Theorem 4 in Zame (2007).
The set  X plays a key role in obtaining equitable Paretian SWFs in the
intergenerational framework. It seems pertinent to characterize it in greater
details, in order to evaluate its extend compared to the whole set X.
To get an intuition of what is required of an innite consumption stream
to be re-ordered, consider the sequence x = (1;0;0;).3 For any  2 , it
is necessarily the case that4 (1) < +1 so that any re-ordered sequence has
the form (0;0; ;0;1;0;). Hence x cannot be reordered to form a non-
decreasing sequence.
The example illustrates what it takes for an innite stream not to belong to
 X. This is all that is needed to completely characterize the set  X. To do so,





the cardinality of the set (x;t).
3I would like to thank Geir Asheim for mentioning this example, which led to the charac-
terization of the set  X.
4The fact that (1) < +1 for any  2  does not mean that attention is restricted to nite
length permutations. Finite length permutations entail that there exists a number l < +1
such that j(t) tj < l, which may not be the case if the distance between t and (t) increases
with t (at least for some t). Still, j(1)   1j must be nite for any innite permutation.
10Proposition 2. An intergenerational allocation x belongs to  X if and only if











+1. Then, for any  2 , (t) < +1 and it is impossible that for all  2
(x;t); () < (t): x cannot be re-ordered to form a non-decreasing sequence.
Sucency: Let x 2  X. The set (x;1) is nite and can be re-ordered in non-
decreasing order. These coordinate will form the n1 rst elements of the ordered




. And (1) = n1 + 1. Then let t2 be the rst
period such that xt2  x1. The set (x;t2)n(x;1) is nite and can be ordered
in increasing order. These will form the n2 next elements in the ordered stream,




. And (t2) = n1 + n2 + 2. Pursuing this
procedure, the stream x can be completely ordered.
Proposition 2 delineates the set of sequences that can be reordered to form
non-decreasing streams. It appears that sucient `increasingness' of the initial
stream is required: at any point in time all future generations but a nite number
of them must be better-o. This makes clear that many consumption streams,
including decreasing ones, cannot be ranked by the RDU criterion. A question
that one may naturally ask is whether it is possible to dene equitable Paretian
SWFs on other subsets of X.
An obvious example is the set X of innite streams that can be re-ordered
in non-increasing sequences. Using the same methods as in Proposition 2, this
set can be characterized as the set of innite streams such that at any period
all future generations but a nite number must be less well-o. For any x 2 X,
denoting x[ ]  the re-ordering in a non-increasing sequence of x, the following





where each at is positive scalar. The problem with these representations is that
limt!+1 at = 0, so that the welfare of the worst-o generation is not taken
11into account in the social welfare. This violates self-evident distributive equity
principles.
Outside  X [ X, it is dicult to see whether one can represent equitable
Paretian SWFs. It must be noticed however that outside  X [ X there are
sequences with both increasing and decreasing subsequences. Contradictions
like the one in the proof of 1.a. of Proposition 1 are therefore likely to arise.
Despite their restricted domain of denition, I will show in Section 7 that
RDU criteria can be operationalized by extending their range with properties
underlying their denition.
4 Rank-discounted utilitarian social welfare functions
In this section, I oer a characterization of RDU SWFs.
Axioms 1-3 are usual ingredients in the characterization of SWFs. Another
usual requirement is continuity. It guarantees that the social ranking does not
change too much for small errors on the exact allocation.
Axiom 4 Continuity. For all x;y in  X, if a sequence x1;x2; ;xk; of
allocations in  X is such that limk!1 supt2N jxk
t   xtj = 0 and, for all k 2 N,
xk  y (resp. xk  y), then x  y (resp. x  y).
Continuity axioms have been carefully discussed in the literature on inter-
generational equity because they may conict with other ethical principles. In
particular, some forms of continuity conict with the anonymity axiom in innite
settings. In this respect, the sup norm continuity promoted by Axiom 4 seems
appropriate, for it is compatible with the most general anonymity axiom (Emov
and Koshevoy , 1994, Theorem 4). The sup topology is the coarsest topology
doing so under the monotonicity requirement (Lauwers , 1997, Theorem 1).
The fth axiom used in the characterization is a dominance axiom that
completes the eciency requirements imposed by Axiom 2.
Axiom 5 Restricted Dominance. For any positive real numbers x and y, if
x > y then (x;xc)  (y;xc).
12The Restricted Dominance axiom prevents a dictatorship of the future, in
the sense of Chichilnisky (1996). Indeed, it entails that a strict preference by
the current poor generation may be sucient to impose a strict preference for
the society: the situation of future generations is not the only thing that matters
from a social point of view.
A key condition to obtain rank-dependent social welfare functions is an inde-
pendence condition closely related to the comonotonic sure-thing principle that
has been introduced in the theory of decision under uncertainty (see Gilboa ,
1987; Wakker , 1993).
Axiom 6 Independence on Non-decreasing Streams. For any x;y;x0;y0 2 X+
and for any T  N, if (i) xt = x0
t and yt = y0
t for all t 2 T ; (ii) xt = yt and
x0
t = y0
t for all t 2 N n T ; then
x  y () x
0  y
0
Axiom 6 states that the social evaluation is unaected by unconcerned gen-
erations provided that the ranking of generations is left intact. Therefore, the
only way the comparisons of the welfare of two generations may be aected by
the welfare of other generations is through their ranks in the intergenerational
distribution. Axiom 6 enables to retain part of the separability properties of
independence axioms, while allowing the ranks to matter in the social evalua-
tion. These are precisely the main features of RDU SWFs, which are additively
separable on ordered streams, but have rank-dependent social weights.
Our last axiom is also a rank dependent axiom. It corresponds to the widely
used stationarity axiom, but the application is restricted to non-decreasing
streams. Stationarity implies constant utility trade-os between consecutive
period. Similarly, our axiom will imply constant utility trade-os, but for gen-
erations with consecutive ranks in the intergenerational distribution.
Axiom 7 Stationarity on Non-decreasing Streams. For any x;y;2 X+ and for
any z 2 R+, such that z  min(x1;y1)
(z;x)  (z;y) () x  y
13The main representation result of the paper can now be stated.
Proposition 3. A SWR  on  X satises Axioms 1-7 if and only if it is a RDU
SWO.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. It relies on a simplied version of Koop-
mans (1960)'s proof, similar to the one in Bleichrodt, Rhode and Wakker (2008).
The proof is applied to non-decreasing streams, so that it is necessary to use the
techniques developed by Wakker (1993) for additive representation of prefer-
ences on rank-ordered sets. Continuity allows us to extend from a nite number
of period to an innite number of periods the representation on non-decreasing
streams. Anonymity allows us to extend the representation to whole set  X.
Proposition 3 provides a rank-dependent extension of the DU model. Our
axioms are close to Koopmans's ones, so that the comparison between discounted
utility and rank-discounted utility is straightforward. Our anonymity axiom,
which is intuitively appealing in the context of intergenerational justice, can be
translated in terms of patience in the context of time preferences (see R ebill e
, 2007). Proposition 3 therefore also provides an axiomatization of a family of
patient intertemporal utilities on  X.
One diculty with RDU SWFs is that they are not recursive. In partic-
ular, they do not satisfy the property of separable future (see Fleurbaey and
Michel , 2003). Indeed, the evaluation of a consumption stream from period
t onward depends on the past through the rank of past generations (but not
through their actual consumptions nor the distribution of consumption between
them). Recursivity is restored on the set of non-decreasing sequences, so that
traditional methods can be used if an additional sustainability requirement of
non-decreasingness is imposed. Still, non-recursivity may be a source of analyt-
ical complexity. I will therefore discuss the applicability of the criterion in more
detail in the last section of the paper.
It is convenient in applications to consider the more specic class of homoth-
etic RDU SWFs (in short, HRDU SWFs). HRDU SWFs indeed yield clear-cuts
14results for comparisons of inequality aversions and for the expression of the
discount rate.
Denition 2. A SWR  on  X is a homothetic rank-discounted utilitarian SWR




















HRDU SWFs satisfy a property of relative invariance. For any x 2  X and
 > 0, let x be the consumption stream such that x = (x1;x2; ;xt;).
Axiom 8 Relative invariance. For any x and y in  X, and any  > 0, x 
y =) x  y.
Axiom 8 states that the equivalence between x and y is preserved by a
simultaneous multiplication of the consumptions in x and y by the same positive
factor. One alleged justication for the axiom is that change in the measurement
unit of consumption (taking the form of a money conversion) should not alter
social judgements. The axiom has actually broader consequences. It also means
that the relative situations of generations (their consumption shares) is what
matters from the social point of view.
The consequences of Axiom 8 are well-known in the literature on inequality
measurement (Ebert , 1988). It can easily be showed that HRDU preferences are
the only RDU preferences satisfying Axiom 8. The proof is therefore omitted.
5 Inequality aversion
Up to now, I have addressed the issue of procedural equity and its compatibility
with eciency. In this section, I am going to introduce concerns for distribu-
tional equity. I will show that inequality aversion can be properly measured and
compared within the RDU class of preferences. The next two sections will show
that inequality aversion has signicant policy implications. I will henceforth
restrict attention to RDU SWOs.
155.1 The Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and inequality aversion
It is a common practice to express distributional equity ideals by means of
transfer axioms. In this paper a weak form of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle
is considered:
Axiom 9 Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. For any x;y 2  X, if there exists " > 0
and a pair of positive integers (;0) such that "  y + " = x  x0 = y0   "
and yt = xt for all t 6= ;0 then x  y.
In this section, I study the restrictions imposed by Axiom 9 on RDU criteria.
These restrictions hold on the rank-discount factor  and on the utility function
u in Equation (1). I shall henceforth refer to a particular RDU SWF as W;u.


















This index has two interesting properties (Chateauneuf, Cohen and Meilijson
, 2005): 1/ Cu  1, with Cu = 1 corresponding to u concave; 2/ and, when u is
dierentiable, Cu = supyx
u0(x)
u0(y).
The non-concavity index Cu and the discount factor  jointly characterize
RDU SWFs satisfying the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.
Proposition 4. A RDU SWF W;u on  X satises Axiom 9 if and only if
  Cu  1
Proof. The proof of the Proposition is in the Appendix.
Condition   Cu  1 means that the utility function u must not be `too
concave'. The concavity of u, though sucient, is not necessary for a RDU
SWO to satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. The (weak) concavity of u
is however necessary and sucient if attention is restricted to HRDU SWFs. For
a HRDU SWF it is indeed the case that Cu = 1 whenever   0 and Cu = +1
whenever  < 0. This is summarized in the following corollary of Proposition 4:
16Corollary 1. A HRDU SWO on  X satises Axiom 9 if and only if   0.
5.2 Comparative inequality aversion
Ranking dierent criteria according to the strength of their concerns for equality
is an important prerequisite to study the policy implications of inequality aver-
sion. The common way to do so is to compare the degree of inequality aversion
of the underlying SWFs. The aim of this section is to perform such comparisons
in the case of RDU SWFs.
I follow the procedure proposed in the literature on risk/uncertainty aversion
to make such comparisons (Grant and Quiggin , 2005). It consists in: (i) dening
an inequality relation I; (ii) declaring a SWO  at least as inequality averse as
a SWO b  if, for any allocation y, whenever a less unequal allocation x (according
to I) is preferred to y according to b , then x is also preferred to y according
to .
I use a simple denition of the relation `more unequal than' based on the
notion of local increase in inequality. is based on increases in the inequalities
aecting only two generations and leaving generations' ranks unchanged. That
is why I use the expression `local increase in inequality'. For the denition, recall
that ftg denotes the rank of generation t in the intergenerational distribution.
Denition 3. For any x;y 2 X, y represents an elementary increase in in-
equality with respect to allocation x, denoted y I x, if there exists a pair
of positive real numbers (";"0) and a pair of positive integers (;0) such that
y + " = x  x0 = y0   "0, xb   y, y0  xb 0 and yt = xt for all t 6= ;0,
where b  and b 0 are such that fb g = fg   1 and fb 0g = f0g + 1.
The inequality relation I is used to dene comparative inequality aversion:
Denition 4. A SWO  is at least as inequality averse as a SWO b  if, for
any x and any y I x: (i) x b  y =) x  y, and (ii) x b  y =) x  y.
Consider now two RDU SWFs, W;u and W^ ;^ u, representing two RDU SWOs
 and b . To assess relative inequality aversion, the discount factors  and ^ 
17and the relative concavity of the utility functions u and ^ u must be compared.
More precisely, the following two indices can be introduced:
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  ^ 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^ u(x2)   ^ u(x1)

The index D(; ^ ) is an index of the relative decreasing speed of the social
weights. The faster the social weights decrease, the less the society cares for
better-o generations. The index C(u;^ u) is an index of relative concavity of the
utility functions u and ^ u. As noticed by Grant and Quiggin (2005), C(u;^ u)  1,
with C(u;^ u) = 1 corresponding to the case where u is an increasing concave trans-
formation of ^ u. In addition, if u and ^ u are dierentiable, C(u;^ u) = supyx
u0(x)^ u0(y)
u0(y)^ u0(x).
For two RDU SWFs, comparative inequality aversion can be characterized
as follows:
Proposition 5. Consider two RDU SWFs W;u and W^ ;^ u on  X. W;u is at
least as inequality averse as W^ ;^ u if and only if
D(;^ )  C(u;^ u)
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix
It is clear from Proposition 5 that a necessary condition for W;u to be at
least as inequality averse as W^ ;^ u is that   ^ . A more inequality averse RDU
social observer should have a lower rank-discount factor and thus discount more
the utility of better-o generations. And in the case  = ^ , u must be a concave
transformation of ^ u.
Even clearer results can be obtained in the case of HRDU SWFs. Indeed,
it is straightforward that, whenever u(x) = x1 
1  and ^ u(x) = x1 ^ 
1 ^  , C(u;^ u) = 1
18if   ^ , and C(u;^ u) = +1 if  < ^ . Denote W; a HRDU SWF with rank-
discount factor  and utility function u(x) = x1 
1  , there exist simple conditions
for comparative inequality aversion of HRDU SWFs:
Corollary 2. Consider two HRDU SWFs W(;) and W^ ;^  on  X. W; is at
least as inequality averse as W(^ ;^ ) if and only if   ^  and   ^  (with at least
one strict inequality for the two SWFs not to be identical).
As in the static case inequality aversion is a key policy parameter, so in
intertemporal problems it is bound to play an important role in designing the
optimal policy. In Section 6, I describe how it aects social discounting. In
Section 7, I study optimal RDU policies, and I highlight the impact of inequality
aversion.
6 Rank-discounted utilitarianism and social discounting
The social discount rate plays a key role in intertemporal social cost-benet
analysis. In recent years, few economic parameters have attracted as much
attention.
Indeed, triggered by the Stern (2006) review of climate change, the social
discount rate has been hotly debated, notably in contributions by Nordhaus
(2007), Weitzman (2007), and Dasgupta (2008). The controversy has not held
on the social welfare function used to assess dierent paths: all the authors
have endorsed the DU approach. The controversy has held on the value of the
parameters in the DU SWF, W(x) =
P+1
t=1 t 1u(xt). In particular, the time-
discount factor  and the elasticity of marginal utility  xu00(x)=u0(x) have a
critical role in the determination of the social discount rate. But there has been
no consensus on the interpretation and the value of these key parameters.
In this section, I will derive the social discount rate arising from RDU SWFs.
Doing so I prove that key parameters of the social discount rate have interpre-
tations in terms of inequality aversion.
Let assume that the function u in Equation (1) is twice continuously dier-
entiable. In that case W is said to be a smooth RDU SWF. Let also consider
19consumption paths such that no pairs of generations have the same consumption
level. The set of such paths is denoted  X6=. A smooth RDU SWF is dierentiable
on  X6= only.
The social discount rate evaluates how much an increase in marginal con-
sumption in period t is `worth' in terms of rst period consumption. To obtain
the formal expression, imagine that today (period 1) the society can make a
marginal investment " whose rate of return is r. The generation born in period
t will therefore be able to consume (1 + r)t 1" more units of aggregate good.









The social discount rate is the rate of return that makes the change in social
welfare nil, so that the marginal welfare cost of diering consumption is exactly
equal to its marginal welfare benet. The formal denition of the social discount
rate t(x) is therefore:
Denition 5. Let W be the SWF used to evaluate policies. The social discount








Consider a smooth RDU SWF W;u. Denote  = 1
   1 the rank discount
rate. Also denote u(x) =  xu00(x)=u0(x) the elasticity of marginal utility for the
utility function u. In addition gt(x) =
xt x1
x1 is the rate of growth in consumption
between period 1 and t, and ~ gt(x) =
gt(x)
t 1 is the rate growth in annualized terms
(the `average' per period growth between 1 and t).
A simple approximation of the social discount rate associated with a smooth
RDU SWF can be derived:
Proposition 6. Let W;u be a smooth RDU SWF. The social discount rate at




 + u(x1)~ gt(x) (3)
























Therefore, (1 + )ftg f1g u0(x1)






















Approximation (3) oers several insights concerning the social discount rate.
First, it appears that the social discount rate is rank-dependent: it depends cru-
cially on the distance between the welfare rank of generation t and the one of the
rst generation. The further generation t in the intergenerational distribution,
the larger the social discount rate. On the contrary, the lower generation t in
the intergenerational distribution, the lower the social discount rate.
This remark leads to a second insight. If generation t is less well-o than
the rst generation, the social discount rate will be negative, provided that
u(x1)  0, which is always the case when u is concave. It has been pointed
out in the literature using a DU approach that the social discount rate may be
negative when future generations are suciently less well-o (see for instance
Dasgupta , 2008, p. 150). With RDU, this should always be the case as soon as
a future generations are less well-o and the function u is concave.
21On the contrary, if one focuses on increasing consumption streams, the fol-
lowing familiar expression can be obtained: t(x)  +u(x1)~ gt(x). For smooth
HRDU SWFs, the expression becomes t(x)   + ~ gt(x). This expression em-
phasizes the crucial role played by the ethical parameters to determine the social
discount rate. Indeed,  and  conjointly characterize the attitude towards in-
equality: a more inequality averse social observer should have a higher  (lower
) and/or a higher . Therefore, a more inequality averse society should discount
the future more whenever it believes that future generations will be better-o.
This insight actually generalizes to all RDU SWFs.
Proposition 7. Let W;u and W^ ;^ ube two smooth RDU SWF and t(x), b t(x)
the associated discount rate. If W;u is at least as inequality averse than W^ ;^ u,
then:
1. t(x)  b t(x) for all t 2 N and for all x 2  X6= such that xt > x1.
2. t(x)  b t(x) for all t 2 N and for all x 2  X6= such that xt < x1.




































We know by Proposition 5 that inft<t0
t 1=b t 1
t0 1=b t0 1 = D;b   Cu;b u = supy<x
u0(x)b u0(y)
u0(y)b u0(x).




























22Within the RDU model, the ethical parameters thus have a clear impact on
social discounting. This contrasts with what occurs within the DU model. In
the DU model, the two parameters  and  represent dierent ethical notions.
The time discounting parameter  measures the intensity of intergenerational
(procedural) inequity. A fair society should choose a lower . On the other
hand, the elasticity of marginal utility  is often interpreted as a measure of
intra-temporal inequality aversion.5 A more egalitarian society should choose a
higher . As a consequence, it is not clear what the social discount rate of an
`equity-minded' society should be: on the one hand, it should discount less the
future to avoid intergenerational inequity; on the other hand, it should discount
more the future because it is more averse to intra-period inequalities.
One strength of the RDU model is that the two parameters have a consistent,
common interpretation in terms of intergenerational inequality aversion. Within
the RDU model, it is meaningless to simultaneously decrease  and increase 
(see Corollary 2). Therefore, a higher discount rate for a given increasing path
has a clear ethical interpretation. Besides a more inequality averse society should
discount less the consumption of a less well-o generation.
The result in Proposition 7 has important policy implications, in particular
for the question of climate change. If one believes that future generations will
be better-o in spite of climate change,6 then a more inequality averse RDU
decision maker will rather adopt the recommendation of Nordhaus (2008) to
have a gradual emissions-control policy with increasing carbon price than those
of Stern (2006) who calls for strong immediate action to mitigate climate change.
Indeed, Nordhaus proposes to use  = 0:015 and  = 2 whereas Stern argues in
favor of  = 0:001 and  = 1.
Of course, the policy recommendation would be totally dierent if one be-
lieved that climate change might strongly aect the economy so that declining
consumption would occur for some generations in the future. This perspective
5Non-ethical (`positive') interpretations of the discount rate consider that  instead repre-
sents risk aversion.
6The assumption is veried in the central scenario of most climate-economy integrated
assessment models, such as the RICE model of Nordhaus (2008) and the PAGE model used
in the Stern (2006) review.
23may not be unrealistic for some poor developing countries particularly exposed
to climate change. In that case, a RDU decision maker using  = 1 and  > 0
would always discount future consumption at a negative rate, lower than the
one that would be promoted by Stern for decreasing consumption streams. This
would prompt even stronger action than the one proposed in the Stern review.
To sum up, from a RDU perspective, climate change jeopardizes intergenera-
tional equity only insofar as it may threaten the livelihood of future generations.
If it only slows the growth rate, no harm is done, because future generations
are still better-o. This remark extends to other dynamic problems: the RDU
approach generally support sustainable policies.
7 Optimal rank-discounted utilitarian policies
The restricted domain of RDU criteria highlighted in Section 3 raises concerns
about their applicability. Since there are many streams that they cannot order,
they may not be able to suggest denite policies in specic economic environ-
ments. In particular, in traditional economic growth models, some decreasing
streams are feasible and they cannot be ranked by RDU criteria.
In this section, I provide a method to extend RDU rankings in order to dene
optimal RDU policies. I show that, in two benchmark cases (the Ramsey growth
model and the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow growth model), these policies are the same
as the ones promoted by the sustainable discounted utilitarian (SDU) criteria
recently studied by Asheim and Mitra (2010).
7.1 Extended Rank-Discounted Utilitarian preferences
In order to obtain eective SWRs capable of advocating specic policies, I pro-
pose to apply RDU on the set  X and to complete it on other paths with appealing
principles. In this respect Axiom 2 (Intermediate Pareto) and Axiom 3' (Finite
Anonymity) are particularly appropriate for two reasons. A rst reason is that
RDU SWOs already satisfy these axioms, so that imposing them on the whole
set of bounded consumption streams X will not conict with the RDU repre-
sentation on  X. A second reason is that eciency and equity requirements are
24known to recommend sustainable paths under certain technological assumptions
(Asheim, Buchholz and Tungodden , 2001). Since RDU criteria are well-dened
on sustainable paths, specic recommendations can be obtained.
We therefore propose the following denition of Extended RDU preferences
(in short ERDU).
Denition 6 Extended RDU SWR. A SWR  on X is an ERDU SWR with
parameters  and u, denoted ;u, if and only if it satises Axioms 2 and 3' on
X and it is represented by the RDU SWF W;u on  X.
In order to dene a specic intertemporal economic environment, let intro-
duce a technology F. The function F gives the maximum consumption attain-
able for generation t if kt is inherited and kt+1 bequeathed, where kt and kt+1
are vectors of capital stock. Hence a consumption path tx = (xt;xt+1;) is
F-feasible at t given kt if and only if, for any t0  t, 0 < xt0  F(kt0;kt0 +1) and
kt0 > 0. Denote XF(kt) the set of F-feasible consumption path given kt.
Denition 7 Productive technology. A technology F is productive if for any
x 2 XF(k1) and any  < 0, if x > x0, there exist scalars t > 0, t > , such
that the consumption stream y dened as follows is F-feasible given k1: yt = xt
for all t < , y = x0, y0 = x + 0 and yt = xt + t for all t > , t 6= 0.
The productivity assumption states that delaying consumption can improve
the consumption of all future generations. It strengthens the immediate pro-
ductivity assumption of Asheim, Buchholz and Tungodden (2001). As in the
presence of the Strong Pareto axiom immediate productivity permits to show
that only sustainable paths can be chosen, so does the productivity assumption
in the presence of Intermediate Pareto. We will say that a F-feasible consump-
tion stream x is optimal for ;u if and only if there exists no other F-feasible
consumption stream y such that y ;u x.
Proposition 8. Assume that the technology F is productive. A F-feasible path
is optimal for ;u only if it is non-decreasing.
Proof. Consider a F-feasible consumption stream x such that x1 > xt for some
t > 1. Since F is productive, there exist scalars t > 0, such that the following
25consumption stream y is F-feasible: y1 = xt, yt = x1 + t and yt0 = xt0 + t0 for
all t0 > 1, t0 6= t. Denote ~ x the consumption stream such that ~ x1 = xt, ~ xt = x1
and ~ xt0 = xt0 for all t0 = 2 f1;tg. By Weak Anonymity (Axiom 3'), ~ x ;u x. But
by Intermediate Pareto (Axiom 2), y ;u ~ x. Hence, y ;u x: the consumption
stream x is not optimal for ;u.
Now consider a F-feasible consumption stream x such that x1  xt for all
t > 1 (otherwise it is not optimal). Assume that x2 > xt for some t > 2. Since
F is productive, the same reasoning as before implies that the consumption
stream x cannot be optimal for ;u. Repeating the method, we obtain that a
F-feasible consumption stream x must be non-decreasing in order to be optimal
for ;u.
Proposition 8 can be contrasted with Proposition 4 of Asheim, Buchholz and
Tungodden (2001). The result is similar but it is based on dierent assump-
tions: their productivity assumption has been strengthened but their Paretian
requirement has been weakened (Intermediate Pareto is used instead of Strong
Pareto). Arguably, the strengthening of the productivity assumption I propose
is not too costly: I will show in the next Sections that it is satised by several
models that also satisfy immediate productivity. On the other hand, the Inter-
mediate Pareto axiom is exactly the strengthening of Weak Pareto that makes it
possible to obtain the result in Proposition 8. The reason for proposing Axiom 2
was precisely to have the weakest axiomatics justifying sustainability in several
technological contexts.
Proposition 8 is important to obtain explicit recommendations based on
ERDU SWRs. Indeed, ERDU SWRs are well-dened and complete on the set
of non-decreasing sequences. More precisely they correspond to DU preferences
on this set.
For an ERDU SWR ;u, let name corresponding discounted utility the SWO
represented by
P
t2N t 1u(xt). Denote X
+
F(k1) the set of non-decreasing F-
feasible consumption streams. The following corollary of Proposition 8 com-
pletely characterizes optimal consumption streams for ;u.
26Corollary 3. Assume that the technology F is productive. The set of optimal F-
feasible consumption streams for ;u is the set of optimal consumption streams
over X
+
F(k1) for the corresponding discounted utility.
Corollary 3 highlights the similarities between the RDU approach and the DU
approach. The RDU solution indeed corresponds to the DU solution constrained
by a requirement of sustainability. As a consequence, the RDU solution will be
the DU one whenever the latter corresponds to a non-decreasing consumption
stream, a situation that typically arises in growth theory.
Corollary 3 also emphasizes the similarity with Asheim (1988) and Asheim
(1991). Both papers have proposed criteria yielding to the maximization of
discounted utility over the set of non-decreasing path. The SDU preferences of
Asheim and Mitra (2010) also recommend this kind of policy in several models.
The next Sections describe the common solutions of these dierent criteria in
two benchmark growth models.
The particularity of the RDU approach is to highlight the role of inequality
aversion. I will then also indicate the impact of inequality aversion on policy
recommendations.
7.2 The Ramsey growth model
The canonical model of economic growth is the one-sector capital accumulation
model also called Ramsey model. There is a stock of non-negative man-made
physical capital kt which is used to produce the single homogenous good which
can either be consumed or accumulated as physical capital. Hence,
xt + kt+1  f(kt) + kt; xt  0; kt > 0
for any t 2 N along a feasible consumption stream.
In the Ramsey model, the production function f is assumed to be strictly
increasing, concave, continuously dierentiable on R+, with limk!+1 f0(k) = 0
and f(0) = 0. Hence the Ramsey technology is FR(kt;kt+1) = f(kt) + kt   kt+1.
Lemma 1. The Ramsey technology FR is productive.
27Proof. Let x 2 XFR(k1) be such that x > x0 for some  < 0. We construct an
alternative feasible capital sequence ~ k in the following way. For t  , ~ kt = kt.
At period  + 1, ~ k+1 = k+1 + x   x0 > k+1. At period  + 2  t  0, ~ k is
dened recursively by ~ kt = kt+t 1+~ kt 1 kt 1, with t 1 =
f(~ kt 1) f(kt 1)
2 . Since
f is strictly increasing, t > 0 and ~ kt > kt for any +1  t  0 1. Furthermore,
~ k = k +
P0 1
t=+1 t + ~ k+1  k+1 = k +
P0 1
t=+1 t +x  x0. At period 0 +1,




2 > 0. From period 0 + 2, ~ k
is dened recursively by ~ kt = kt + t 1, with t 1 =
f(~ kt 1)+~ kt 1 f(kt 1) kt 1
2 > 0.
Now dene the consumption stream y as follows: yt = xt for all t < ,
y = x0, y0 = x + 0 and yt = xt + t for all t > , t 6= 0. By construction, y
is FR-feasible using the capital sequence ~ k. Hence the Ramsey technology FR is
productive.
Given that the Ramsey technology is productive, we know that ERDU cri-
teria give explicit solutions, as described in Corollary 3. Actually, the solution
is unique. To characterize it, additional notation is needed.
Write the gross output function as g(k) = f(k)+k. Denote x(y) the unique
solution to the equation y = g(y   x(y)) such that 0  x(y)  y. The function
x(y) is well-dened, continuous and dierentiable (see Asheim and Mitra , 2010).









. The function y1 is strictly increasing in 
(Asheim and Mitra , 2010).
Proposition 9 Asheim, 1991. Consider an ERDU SWR ;u, with 0 <  < 1,
a Ramsey technology, and an initial level of capital k1. There exists a unique
optimal FR-feasible consumption streams for ;u, denoted x, which is charac-
terized as follows:
1. If y1 = g(k1)  y1(), then x is a stationary path with x
t = x(y1) for
any t  1.
2. If y1 = g(k1) < y1(), then x is an increasing path, converging to
x(y1()) and maximizing the associated discounted utility over XFR(k1).
28Proof. Lemma 1 and Proposition 8 imply that RDU optimal consumption streams
must be the associated optimal DU streams among non-decreasing streams.
Proposition 6 in Asheim (1991) then yields the result.
Proposition 9 shows that RDU preferences can be operationalized in the
basic Ramsey model. We are able to characterize a unique optimal solution,
that we call the sustainable discounted utilitarian solution for it is the same as
in Asheim (1991) and Asheim and Mitra (2010).
The advantage of RDU preferences over SDU preferences is that they em-
phasize the inuence of inequality aversion on optimal policy. Indeed, we know
that a necessary condition for a RDU SWF W;u to more inequality averse than
another RDU SWF W^ ;^ u is that   ^ . From Proposition 9, it is clear that:
 A more inequality averse RDU society ;u will converge to a lower steady
state than a less inequality averse society ^ ;^ u in many situations (actually,
as soon as g(k1) < y1(^ )).
 A more inequality averse RDU society ;u will prevent growth more often
than a less inequality averse society ^ ;^ u (actually, whenever y1(^ ) 
g(k1)  y1()).
Regarding the second point, one can notice that the maximin always prevents
growth. The maximin is the special case of RDU preferences where  ! 0, an
extreme aversion to inequality. For other values of , growth is prevented only
in certain circumstances. The lower  the more often this will happen.
Inequality aversion therefore modies both the long-run perspectives of the
society and the prospects of an egalitarian (stationary) distribution. Remark
that only the parameter  determines the long-term impact of inequality aver-
sion. The other dimension of inequality aversion, namely the concavity of the
function u, would only have an impact on the speed of the convergence to the
steady state in the case g(k1) < y1().
297.3 The Dasgupta-Heal-Solow growth model
The Dasgupta-Heal Solow model (Dasgupta and Heal , 1974; Solow , 1974) is
the standard model of growth with an exhaustible natural resource. Production
depends on a man-made physical capital km
t (which is homogeneous to the con-
sumption good), on the extraction dt of a natural exhaustible resource kn
t and of
the labor supply lt. The natural resource is depleted by the resource use, so that
kn
t+1 = kn
t  dt. The production function ^ f(km
t ;dt;lt) is concave, non-decreasing,
homogeneous of degree one, and twice continuously dierentiable. It satises
( ^ fkm; ^ fd; ^ fl)  0 for all (km;d;l)  0 and ^ f(km;0;l) = ^ f(0;d;l) = 0 (both the
physical capital and the natural resource are essential in the production). Be-
sides, given (~ km; ~ d)  0, there exists a scalar ~  such that for (km;d) such that
km  ~ km and 0  d  ~ d,
d ^ fd(km;d;1)
^ fl(km;d;1)  ~ .
Assume that the labor force is constant and normalized to 1. Denote f(km;d) :=
^ f(km;d;1). Also assume that f is strictly concave and fkm;d(km;d)  0 for all
(km;d)  0. Along a feasible plan for the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technology, we
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Lemma 2. The Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technology FDHS is productive.
Proof. Let x 2 XFR(km
1 ;kn
1) be such that x > x0 for some  < 0. For the
natural capital, we keep the same path. For the physical capital, we compute
an alternative path like in the proof of Lemma 1. Then the proof proceeds in a
similar way.
One question has attracted particular attention in the literature on the
Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model: is it possible maintain a constant consumption
level for ever? Cass and Mitra (1991) have answered this issue by providing a
necessary and sucient condition for the existence of a sustainable consumption
30level. To introduce their condition, let h be the resource requirement function
dened as follows:
h(y;k
m) = mind subject to y  f(k




(y;km) : km  0 and there exists d  0 such that y  f(km;d)
o
.
The function h describes the minimal level of resource required to yield a given
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m(y) is the lower bound on physical capital stock that permit to
maintain a given level of output without resource depletion. We assume that the






= 0; for any 0 < k
m < k
m(y)
The condition roughly ensures that pure physical accumulation is feasible
from any initial conditions, and permits to avoid resource exhaustion. In the
Cobb-Douglas case, f(km;d) = (km)(d), the condition amounts to  > :
the elasticity of production of man-made capital must exceed the elasticity of
production of the natural resource use.
It is possible to show (see Cass and Mitra , 1991) that, under the other
assumptions of the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model and whenever the Cass-Mitra
substitution condition holds, there exists a stationary, FDHS-feasible and e-





1) this level of consumption that can be sustained for ever. It is
possible to attach a sequence of (shadow)-prices p(km
1 ;kn
1) to the correspond-
ing stationary sequence (for a characterization of the prices, see Asheim and










1 ). Optimal RDU
consumption streams can be fully described:
Proposition 10 Asheim, 1988. Consider an ERDU SWR ;u, with 0 <  <
311, a Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technology, and initial levels of capital (km
1 ;kn
1) 
0. There exists a unique optimal FDHS-feasible consumption streams for ;u,
denoted x, which is characterized as follows:
1. If 1(km
1 ;kn




any t  1.
2. If 1(km
1 ;kn
1) < , then x is the ecient and non-decreasing consumption





Denoting  = min
n







, this stream exhibits
the following pattern:
 For t < , x
t < x
t+1.








Proof. Lemma 2 and Proposition 8 imply that RDU optimal consumption streams
must be the associated optimal DU streams among non-decreasing streams.
Under the assumptions of the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model (notably Cass-Mitra
substitution condition), this optimal stream is unique and it is the one described
in Lemma 4 in Asheim (1988).
Proposition 10 shows that the consequences of a higher level of inequality
aversion exhibited in the Ramsey growth model still hold in the Dasgupta-Heal-
Solow model. Indeed:
 A more inequality averse RDU society ;u will stop growing at a lower
stationary level of consumption than a less inequality averse society ^ ;^ u
whenever 1(km
1 ;kn
1) < ^ .
 A more inequality averse RDU society ;u will prevent growth more often
than a less inequality averse society ^ ;^ u (whenever   1(km
1 ;kn
1)  ^ ).
In particular, in the maximin case, growth will always be prevented. Once
again, the maximin case represents an extreme form of inequality aversion, and
less extreme cases allow for growth in some cases. Also note that, once again,
only the parameter  determines the long-term impact of inequality aversion.
32The concavity of the function u would only have an inuence on the transition
to the stationary phase.
8 Conclusion
The RDU approach to intertemporal welfare has several appealing features.
First, it reconciles intergenerational procedural equity and eciency on its do-
main of denition. Second, it enables to express a range of distributive concerns
for successive generations. A last appealing feature of the RDU approach is
that it provides a consistent and intuitive interpretation of the ethical param-
eters determining the social discount rate. With the RDU interpretation, we
have obtained the provocative statement that inequality aversion increases the
social discount rate along increasing consumption streams.
The statement is at odds with the traditional ethical approach to social dis-
counting. It comes from the fact that RDU criteria do satisfy procedural equity
(the reason why people endorsing the traditional ethical approach have called for
lower discount rates) while allowing for inequality-aversion-based discounting. I
believe that RDU may spark o new debates on social discounting within the
ethical approach to social discounting.
The RDU resulting policies are closely related to the one promoted by sus-
tainable discounted utilitarian (SDU) SWFs that have been recently studied by
Asheim and Mitra (2010). While their axiomatization is designed to obtain a
complete ordering on X, mine highlights the role of procedural equity and in-
equality aversion. But in practice SDU and RDU criteria would suggest similar
recommendations (provided that RDU is completed by the sustainability Ax-
ioms 2 and 3'). One advantage of RDU is to provide an ethical interpretation of
the parameters in the discounted sum of utilities in terms of inequality aversion.
In conclusion, the RDU model can be operationalized. While its recommen-
dations may not be new, the RDU model oers an interesting new perspective
that respects procedural equity and displays concerns for intergenerational redis-
tribution. It shades some new lights on what we owe to future generations: we
have to increase their resources if we can do so; we have to guarantee that they
33won't be worse-o than we are; but we must not be unfair to present generations
and we must ensure that intergenerational inequalities are not too large. This
conception of intergenerational equity, more in line with the intuitive notion of
distributive equity, may seem appealing to many.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.
The suciency part of the Proposition is obvious.
For the necessity, rst remark that axioms 1, 2, and 4 imply that there exists
a monotonic SWF W representing  on  X. By Axiom 3, we know that whatever
x 2  X, W(x) = W(x[ ]). We can therefore restrict attention to the set X+.
Now, for each T 2 N, we introduce the following subset of X+: X
+
T = fx 2
X+ : xt = xT+1;8t  T + 1g. These are the nondecreasing intergenerational
allocations with a constant tail from period T + 1 onward. Let T be the
restriction of  to the set X
+
T. It is a continuous monotonic weak order on

(x1; ;xT+1) 2 RT+1 : x1    xT+1
	
, a rank-ordered set. Furthermore,
it satises the usual independence condition (sure-thing principle). Hence, by
Theorem 3.2. and Corollary 3.6 of Wakker (1993), there exists a cardinal




ut;T(xt) + VT(xT+1); 8x 2 X
+
T (7)
The functions ut;T and VT are all continuous and nondecreasing. In addition, by
Axioms 2, 5 and 7, the functions u1;T and VT must be increasing. By cardinality,
we may set ut;T(0) = 0 for all t  T and VT(0) = 0 (normalization condition).
Now, representation (7) exists for T whatever T 2 N. Furthermore, T
and T+1 represent the same ordering on X
+
T. By standard uniqueness results
for additive functions on rank-ordered sets, we can take (after the appropriate
7By Axioms 2, 5 and 7 and Gorman's theorem (Gorman , 1968), we know that all coordi-
nates are essential.
34normalization) ut;T  ut;T+1 and VT  uT;T+1 + VT+1. We can henceforth drop
the subscript T in functions ut;T.
By Axiom 7, we also know that WT(x) =
PT
t=1 ut(xt) + VT(xT+1) and
WT(x) =
PT+1
t=2 ut(xt 1)+VT+1(xT+1) represent the same preferences 8x 2 X
+
T.
By the cardinality of the additive representation and the normalization condi-
tion, there must exists a  > 0 such that ut+1(x) = ut(x) and VT+1(x) = VT(x)
for any x 2 X. Remark that  does not depend on t. Denote u  u1 and V  V1,






TV (xT+1); 8x 2 X
+
T
with u and V two increasing functions.
Now remark that we must also have V (x) = u(x) + V (x), so that V (x) =
u(x)
1 . This implies that  < 1 by Axioms 2. This also implies that V (x) =
P+1










Now it remains to prove that the representation extends to the whole set X+.
For any x 2 X+, we dene the sequence x1;x2; ;xk; of allocations in X+
as follows: for any k 2 N, xk
t = xt for all t  k and xk
t = xk for all t > k. Each




T. And limk!1 supt2N jxk
t  xtj = 0,
since we consider bounded streams. By continuity (Axiom 4), we obtain that
W(x) =
P+1
t=1 t 1u(xt) is a SWF representing  on X+.
Finally, by Axiom 3, we obtain that  can be represented on  X by:





Proof of Proposition 4.
Necessity. Consider x 2  X such that xt = 0 for all t  , x  x+1, and
xt > x + x+1 for t >  + 1. Now consider y 2  X such that y + " = x 
35x+1 = y+1   " and yt = xt for all t 6= ; + 1, with x  " > 0. According to

































The construction of allocations x and y yielding this inequation can be done



















 =   Cu
Suciency. Assume that the representation in Equation (1) holds and that
1    Cu.
Now consider x;y 2  X such that "  y +" = x  x0 = y0  ", and yt = xt
for all t 6= ;0, where x  " > 0 and (;0) are positive integers. We want to
show that W(x)   W(y)  0.
Denote fg (resp. f0g) the rank of generation  (resp. 0) in the intergener-
ational distribution x and d fg (resp. d f0g) the rank of generation  (resp. 0) in


















For d fg  t  fg, we have u(x[t])   u(y[t])  0, and for f0g  t  d f0g, we












































= u(y0)   u(x0). Therefore:
























1    
u(x0 + ")   u(x0)
u(x)   u(x   ")

When 1    Cu, it is clear that W(x)   W(y)  0.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Denote  (resp. ^ ) the SWO represented by W(;u) (resp. W(^ ;^ u).
Necessity. Consider x and y in  X such that, for  < 0:
 xt = yt = 0 for all t < ;
 0  y < x  yt = xt  x0 for all  < t < 0;
 y0 = ^ u 1

^ u(x0) + 0 

^ u(x)   ^ u(y)

so that y0  x0;
 and yt = xt > y for t > 0.













^ u(x)   ^ u(y)

, so that x ^  y. Because y I x, and because W(;u) is
37at least as inequality averse as W(^ ;^ u), it must be the case that  1u(x) +































^ u(x)   ^ u(y)

The construction of x and y yielding this inequality can be done for any two







. Denoting ^ X =

(x1;x2;x3;x4) 2 R4
+ : 0 
x1 < x2  x3 < x4;x4 = ^ u 1

^ u(x3) + 0  
^ u(x2)   ^ u(x1)





D(;^ ) = inf
t<t0
=^ 














^ u(x2)   ^ u(x1)
  g Cu;^ u
The next lemma ends the necessity part of the proof:
Lemma 3. Cu;^ u = g Cu;^ u.
Proof. Denote y1 = ^ u(x1), y2 = ^ u(x2), y3 = ^ u(x3) and y4 = ^ u(x4). Cu;^ u can be




y2 y1 = Gu^ u 1,
with Gu^ u 1 the `greediness' index of Chateauneuf, Cohen and Meilijson (2005)
for function u  ^ u 1.
Denote also ^ X =
n
(y1;y2;y3;y4) 2 R4










obtain that g Cu;^ u = sup= 0;<0 Gu^ u 1(). But by Lemma 1 in Chateauneuf,
Cohen and Meilijson (2005) we know that Gu^ u 1 = Gu^ u 1() for any  > 0,
so that Cu;^ u = g Cu;^ u.
38Suciency. Assume that y I x and x ^  y.8 Equation (1) yields:




















^ u(y0)   ^ u(x0)

(9)
Now, we want to compute the dierence W(x)   W(y). Using Equality (9),
we obtain:



































^ u(y0)   ^ u(x0)

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^ u(y0)   ^ u(x0)

 







D;^    Cu;^ u

Consequently, whenever D;^   Cu;^ u, W(;u)(x)  W(;u)(y).
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